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REFLECTIONS ON 
COMPETITION, COMPETITION 
REGULATION AND THE 
CURRENT CRISES
Hubert Buch-Hansen and Angela Wigger*
ABSTRACT
Economists, politicians, business leaders and opinion makers are convinced that 
competition enhances efficiency and maximises social welfare. As a result conditions 
conducive to the maximisation of competition have been created throughout devel-
oped capitalist societies. This article explains how competition came to enjoy such an 
exalted status in Europe and then challenges conventional wisdom by bringing into 
focus the downsides of competition. It argues that excessive competition and neoliberal 
competition regulation have contributed to intensify the economic, political, social and 
environmental crises currently facing humanity. The implication of the argument is 
that these crises can only be solved if prevailing notions of competition and its role in 
society are reconsidered.
The game, mechanisms and effects of competition, which we identify and enhance are not at all 
natural phenomena; competition is not the result of a natural interplay of appetites, instincts, be-
havior. … [C]ompetition as an essential economic logic will only appear and produce its effects 
under certain conditions which have to be carefully and artificially constructed. … Competition 
is therefore an historical objective of governmental art and not a natural given that must be 
respected. (Foucault 2008:120)
INTRODUCTION
For what in fact is competition? It is absolutely not a given of nature. The idea that 
competition produces all sorts of positive effects has been hegemonic for some 
decades.1 Economists, politicians, business leaders and opinion makers almost all 
universally agree that competition enhances efficiency and maximises social wel-
fare. As a consequence of this widespread consensus, conditions conducive to the 
maximisation of competition have been created throughout developed capitalist 
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societies: not only companies, but also employees, public administrations, hospitals, 
schools and universities have increasingly been exposed to the logic of competition. 
Never before has competition been fiercer than it is in the contemporary socio-
economic order. 
The metaphysical status assigned to capitalist competition as the most efficient or-
ganising mechanism of markets finds its precepts in neoclassical economics, build-
ing on what Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations called the ‘invisible hand’ of the 
market. In line with Smith, mainstream economics textbooks praise harsh com-
petition as a way to increase the competitiveness and to improve the performance 
of entire economies. In the words of two neoclassical economists, “competition 
benefits almost everyone” and is “the permanent driving force behind individuals 
as it rewards successful activities and penalizes laziness and failure” (Eekhoff and 
Moch 2004:1). The theoretical benefits of competition furthermore serve to legiti-
mise the opening of markets worldwide: to compete freely eventually requires un-
impaired market access. Put on a par with a natural selection process, in which the 
uncompetitive, weak and inefficient perish, unconstrained competition is believed 
to establish a Darwinian form of ‘market justice’. Neoclassical economists refer in 
this respect to ‘perfect competition’ (Neumann 2001). Although perfect competition 
is widely understood to be an utopian theoretical construct that in all respects fails 
to adequately describe the nature of real world competition (see Stanford 2008), 
neoclassical economists act ‘as if ’ perfect competition could be achieved. To let go 
of perfect competition as a central point of departure in their models and in their 
policy prescriptions would cost too much theoretically (Rist 2010:41).  
In this article, we first outline how competition came to enjoy such an exalted 
status in Europe and then offer some reflections on competition and competition 
regulation in the context of the economic, political, social and environmental crises 
currently facing humanity. We suggest that excessive competition and the neoliberal 
type of competition regulation have contributed to intensify these various crises, 
and hence are part of the problem rather than the solution.
THE RISE OF THE COMPETITION STATE
This current status of competition should be understood in the context of the as-
cendancy of neoliberal ideas and policies after the 1970s, when the era of ‘embedded 
liberalism’ came to an end (Ruggie 1982). As pointed out by Overbeek, the era of 
post-war capitalism: 
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[C]an be characterised as Fordism when considered at the level of the organization of produc-
tion, as the era of the Keynesian welfare state when looked at from the level of society and state, 
and as the Pax Americana when looked at from the perspective of the overall organization of the 
capitalist world system. (1990:87)
Fordism, which had initially emerged in the United States, was ‘exported’ to Europe 
(especially Germany, France and the United Kingdom) after the Second World War 
and entailed mass production techniques and mass consumption of standardised 
goods. The Fordist growth model fuelled the post-war period of economic growth 
in Europe and was stabilised by what Jessop has dubbed the ‘Keynesian Welfare 
National State’. The latter was Keynesian in the sense that it sought to promote full 
employment through counter-cyclical demand management policies (e.g. active 
fiscal policies); it was a welfare state insofar as it promoted the expansion of uni-
versal welfare rights to all citizens; it was primarily oriented towards the national 
level; and it was statist in the sense that state institutions would compensate for the 
failure of markets to deliver economic growth or full employment (Jessop 2002:59-
61). The Pax Americana world order entailed the construction of national welfare 
states that were based on compromises between organised labour and national 
industrial capital, combined “with a measure of re-liberalization in the international 
sphere. Trade, however, held priority over money capital” (Overbeek and Van der 
Pijl 1993:6). To some extent, this world order entailed “Keynes at home and Smith 
abroad” (Gilpin 1987:355). 
The era of embedded liberalism, stretching from the 1950s to the early 1970s, is 
also known as ‘the golden age of capitalism’ (Hobsbawm 1994). In this period the 
advanced capitalist economies experienced high economic growth rates, a massive 
increase in productivity, unprecedented levels of world trade and low unemploy-
ment rates. It was also an era in which the prevailing view on competition was very 
different from that of today. It was widely acknowledged that capitalist economies 
cannot function without competition, leading to the introduction of competition 
laws in a number of European countries. At the same time, it was also acknowledged 
that cutthroat competition is highly destructive and thus needs to be restricted or 
muted. Governments interfered in the markets with active industrial policies, in 
some cases with a view to promote internationally competitive ‘flagship companies’, 
in other cases to ensure the survival of strategically important enterprises in specific 
industries (Hall 1986). The invisible hand of the market (competition) was in other 
words supplemented with the visible hand of far-reaching state intervention.
In line with this, the competition laws of the core European countries allowed for 
a significant degree of flexibility with respect to the regulation of cartels and mo-
nopolies. This was also the case at the supranational level. The Rome Treaty of 1957, 
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establishing the European Economic Community, contained rules that aimed at the 
protection of competition in the common market while at the same time potentially 
allowing for various anti-competitive practices (Buch-Hansen and Wigger 2011). By 
the early 1970s, capitalism’s golden age came to its end. The world economy entered 
a deep crisis, which, especially after 1973, was reflected in sharp decreases in out-
put, productivity and export growth combined with increasing unemployment and 
inflation in all industrial countries (for figures see Glyn et al. 1990:43-47). Limits to 
the possible expansion of Fordist production methods, growing discontent among 
workers, the emergence of multinational companies that could avoid national con-
trols, as well as rising oil prices were among the most important causes of the crisis. 
In addition to this, high unemployment rates resulting from the economic crisis 
rendered the rather generous Keynesian welfare states very expensive.
Following Jessop (2002), in response to the economic slump and a gradual and 
partial transformation of the Keynesian welfare national state into a ‘Schumpeterian 
workfare post-national regime’ was initiated. In a similar vein, Cerny has suggested 
that a neoliberal ‘competition state’ gradually appeared after the 1970s: 
Rather than an attempt to take certain economic activities out of the market, to ‘decommodify’ 
them as the welfare state was organized to do, the competition state has pursued increased mar-
ketization in order to make economic activities located within the national territory, or which 
otherwise contribute to national wealth, more competitive in international and transnational 
terms. (1997:259) 
Whereas the state in the embedded liberal period sought to shield internationally 
uncompetitive domestic companies from outside competition, while providing so-
cial protection for its citizens, the competition state does the opposite: 
The state and state actors have, in effect, become key promoters of globalization and therefore of 
global competition as the primary requirement for the achievement of economic growth … The 
underlying aim of state intervention in the twenty-first century is therefore not to replace the 
market, but to make it work more efficiently. Government promotion of competition … is the 
most fundamental and indispensable means to this objective. (Cerny 2010:159) 
This transformation was premised on a major shift in the balance of power between 
social forces. Whereas the post-war societies were underpinned by compromises 
between organised labour and nationally oriented industrial capital, the neoliberal 
competition state is a result of transnational capital becoming re-empowered vis-à-
vis organised labour. This allowed its representatives to advocate neoliberal policies, 
comprising of different sets of regulation facilitating the expansion of free markets 
and free competition, including the rollback of the welfare state, a monetarist focus 
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on keeping inflation low, reduced taxes and fiscal austerity, as well as reduced labour 
costs in the form of wage repression and deregulation. The shift towards neoliber-
alism was premised on broader processes of deindustrialisation and technological 
change, as well as the growing transnationalisation of ownership structures and 
production circuits through subcontracting and outsourcing, thereby marking a 
gradual and partial transition towards ‘post-Fordism’ (cf. Jessop and Sum 2006). 
Neoliberalism, in short, sustained a capitalist order in which the dynamics of com-
petitive accumulation of capital could proceed largely unhindered and uncontained.
As part and parcel of this shift, European competition regulation was profoundly 
transformed. This could be witnessed both at national and at EU level where com-
petition regulation was increasingly refocused to benefit internationally competitive 
companies, whereas the interests of employees and not-so-competitive companies 
were increasingly disregarded. In the European Community, the neoliberal type of 
competition regulation gained particular momentum when free market hardliners 
Peter Sutherland (1985–1989) and Leon Brittan (1989–1995) assumed leadership in 
the Directorate General responsible for the European Commission’s enforcement of 
EC competition rules. The changed course (which has ever since been followed by 
consecutive competition commissioners) became manifest in an aggressive pros-
ecution of cartels, state aid and public monopolies and the adoption of a neoliberal 
merger control regulation (Cini and McGowan 2008). 
Whereas the Commission tolerated certain forms of cartels until the 1970s, it started 
to prosecute them with unparalleled vigour from the mid-1980s onwards. Another 
central target was the prohibition of different forms of direct and indirect state aid 
such as subsidised loans, tax concessions, guaranteed procurement, financial guar-
antees and export assistance. By further specifying the conditions for state aid, the 
Commission narrowed the leeway for protectionist industrial policies at member 
state level. The imperatives of unfettered competition were also expanded to state-
owned public utility sectors and networked industries, such as telecommunica-
tions, energy, postal services, water and transport – all sectors that were previously 
exempt from the need to compete under EC competition law (Wilks 2005). Despite 
fierce member state opposition, the Commission endorsed so-called privatisation 
directives under the Treaty’s Article 106(3), a hitherto virtually unused provision, 
allowing it to issue directives in the field of public enterprises and monopolies 
without the approval of the Council. Privatisation was also a high priority when 
the Commission took over the role of guiding the Central and Eastern European 
Countries through the transition to free-market capitalism in the 1990s.
Finally, the EC merger control regulation that was adopted in 1989, and revised in 
2003, moved the powers to control large mergers from the national to the suprana-
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tional level (Cini and McGowan 2008). It entailed a purely neoliberal text, giving 
primacy to undistorted competition in assessing anti-competitive mergers, leaving 
no room for industrial and social policy considerations. At national level, a similar 
neoliberalisation of competition regulation took place, a prime example being the 
reform of the British merger control system (Buch-Hansen 2012).
In sum, neoliberal competition regulation can be seen as an important component 
of the competition state, which has contributed to continuously intensify the forces 
of competition. In the context of the many crises that confront societies today, neo-
liberal competition regulation seems to get further entrenched. As will be outlined 
below, EU institutions such as the European Commission, reiterate ad nauseam 
the need for strict competition control safeguarding free competition as a central 
engine to economic recovery.  
COMPETITION AND THE CURRENT CRISES
There are several crises confronting our societies: first, an economic crisis of low 
growth, huge deficits and high unemployment; second, a social crisis of massive and 
growing inequality; third, a political crisis consisting of a weakening of democracy; 
and fourth, an environmental crisis driven by wasteful production and excessive 
consumption threatening to destabilise the climate (Speth 2008). In what follows, we 
will reflect on competition and neoliberal competition regulation in relation to each 
crisis. While we do not believe that competition and competition regulation alone 
have caused any of these four crises, we suggest that competition and competition 
regulation have contributed to intensify each of them.
First, excessive competition, or what we have referred to as ‘over-competition’ (Wig-
ger and Buch-Hansen 2012; see also Brenner 2006), is one of the root causes of 
the current global economic crisis. Over-competition relates to the problem of 
over-accumulation, notably the lack of attractive possibilities for capital owners to 
reinvest past profits in real economy production at a particular historical juncture 
and location (Robinson 2010). Fierce competition can lead to lower profit rates, 
rendering further investment unattractive (Gordon 1980). As a result, investments 
are channelled elsewhere. As a matter of fact, investment relative to GDP develop-
ment has slowed down in the Western industrialised regions and capital moved 
from the non-financial to the financial sector. As observed by Harvey, “heightened 
competition between producers started to put downward pressure on prices (as seen 
in the Wal-Mart phenomenon of ever-lower prices for US consumers). Profits began 
to fall after 1990 or so in spite of an abundance of low-wage labour.” The result was 
that “more and more money went into speculation on asset values because that was 
where the profits were to be had” (Harvey 2010:29).
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In the rat-race for ever higher returns on investment, also non-financial compa-
nies increasingly targeted financial markets (Krippner 2005:182). This significantly 
strengthened competition for short-term profits in the financial markets, at the 
expense of productive reinvestment of past profits and the creation of employment. 
The historically unprecedented global wave of mergers and acquisitions prior to the 
outbreak of the global economic crisis is also illustrative of this: more than a third 
of these mergers were triggered by finance capital and strongly speculative in nature 
(Wigger 2012). Giant financial bubbles were created, which, like all bubbles, were 
destined to burst. The rest, as they say, is history.
Second, while neoclassical economists might be correct to point out that competi-
tion leads to “a high degree of wealth in society” (Eekhoff and Moch 2004:4); their 
theories ignore the important question of how gains are distributed among people 
in society (Crouch 2011:56). Yet, competition creates and enhances inequalities 
in wealth and power, which extend from individuals and groups to classes and 
geographical regions in the world. Competition thus reaches much further than 
corporate rivalry. Entire territories (states, regions, cities or local townships) com-
pete to create a business-friendly regulatory climate to attract and secure capital – 
and in this competition some societies come out as winners, while others lose out. 
Moreover, as Marx noted, “[t]he battle of competition is fought by cheapening of 
commodities. The cheapness of commodities depends on all other circumstances 
remaining the same, on the productivity of labour […]” (1965:626). The price of 
competition is ultimately paid by employees in the form of lower wages, longer 
working days, worse working conditions or redundancies. In today’s globalised 
production chains, competition is “the greatest disciplinary force confronting work-
ers” (Albo, Gindin, and Panitch 2010:79). In the presence of a reserve army of 
unemployed, competition pits not only capital and labour against each other, but 
also labour against labour. Alongside the fragmentation of labour, competition for 
jobs or for keeping jobs, as well as the individualisation of the wage relationship has 
severe repercussions for the organisational and bargaining power of labour, and in 
a wider sense, solidarity in capitalist societies. 
Third, neoliberal competition regulation is part of the crisis of democracy. Whereas 
democratically elected politicians previously had a large say on the regulatory prac-
tices of many national competition authorities in Europe, this is no longer the case. 
That is, competition rules have increasingly come to be enforced by ‘politically in-
dependent’ (neoliberal newspeak for ‘democratically unaccountable’) authorities. At 
EU level, the Commission’s neoliberal type of competition regulation has regularly 
led to political contestation, most notably from organised labour and governments 
concerned about the economic survival of less competitive domestic companies and 
industries. Such contestation has however been largely ineffectual. As a matter of 
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fact, as pointed out by Erne, “EU competition policy making is completely insulated 
from the citizens that are affected by the decisions of the EU and from the directly 
elected parliamentarians” (2008:122). The system exemplifies what Gill and Law 
(1989) referred to as ‘new constitutionalism’. Shielded from democratic influence, 
the Commission is under no pressure to consider the views of those losing from 
neoliberal regulatory practices – a situation it has taken full advantage of. Competi-
tion regulation is constitutive of the EU’s long-standing democratic deficit, but also 
more generally of the political crisis.
Fourth, the global environment is incapable of sustaining the ever-growing impact 
of our economic activities. These activities are causing the oceans to acidify, tem-
peratures and the sea level to rise, ice caps to melt, forests to disappear and natural 
disasters to occur more intensely and frequently. While competition alone cannot 
be blamed for this environmental crisis, competition (and policies fostering com-
petition) contributes to worsen the global environmental crisis. As pointed out by 
Magdoff and Foster, “competition and the drive for profits causes many companies 
to cut corners regarding worker and environmental safety” (2011:30). Among other 
things, many companies seek to improve their competitive position by ‘externalis-
ing’ their costs, for instance by polluting or selling unsafe products, thereby shed-
ding their liabilities outside the market place. Likewise, they seek to differentiate 
their products “in ways that are wasteful, useless, or even destructive: massive (and 
often misleading) advertising, excess packaging (to make products look ‘bigger’), 
and artificial obsolescence (where products are artificially designed to wear out or 
become useless prematurely)” (Stanford 2008:137). The neoliberal type of competi-
tion regulation in Europe, which departs from efficiency gains in the form of lower 
prices for consumers as the central point of reference for anticompetitive conduct, 
does not pay attention to such negative ‘externalities’ at all. On the contrary, pro-
tecting rampant consumerism is sacrosanct to this form of competition regulation. 
IN CONCLUSION
As pointed out in this article, competition in the era of neoliberal capitalism does 
not only involve companies. Regions, states and cities compete for business invest-
ments; universities compete for students, hospitals for patients, citizens for jobs, 
while the logic of competition and efficiency gains has also been projected on other 
public and semi-public institutions. Competition, in other words, has become all-
pervasive, forcing the citizens of the competition state to behave as competitors. In 
the thrall of the welfare promises of neoliberalism, the call for fierce competition as 
a route to salvation in the current crises seems to mesmerise people of all political 
persuasions. The ‘Compact for Growth and Jobs’, recently adopted by European 
Heads of State or Government, meant to complement the harsh austerity measures 
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implicit in the Fiscal Compact, also thrives on the rhetoric of free competition as 
the way forward (European Council 2012). 
Endorsing the rhetoric of strict competition (regulation) may appear less painful 
than the tight austerity packages and the ongoing onslaughts on social rights and 
wage depression, particularly in times of economic slump and recession when lower 
prices appear much needed. More intense competition as an alleged panacea for the 
current crises does however neither substitute nor halt the draconian cuts in public 
spending. As pointed out by the Group of Lisbon (1995:97) more than a decade 
ago, the desire to win the war of competition may involve “sacrificing the interests 
of the most vulnerable people” in European societies. Competition “contributes to 
the development of social exclusion: the noncompetitive people, firms, cities, and 
nations are left behind. They are no longer the subject of history” (1995:98). 
It is time to break with the one-dimensional neoclassical/neoliberal view and to 
recognise that competition is not a remedy to rising poverty and social exclusion. 
Neoliberal values such as egoism and self-sufficiency eclipse values such as toler-
ance, mutual aid and solidarity. Against the backdrop of the multiple crises currently 
facing us – crises that are all exacerbated by competition and neoliberal competition 
regulation – the competition state has become untenable. Rather than having com-
petition as the overriding logic, it is time to explore alternatives that give priority 
to environmental sustainability, equality and cooperation.  
Reflections on Competition, Competition Regulation and the Current Crises
45
NOTES
1. The present article is based on previous works, in particular Buch-Hansen (2008); Buch-
Hansen and Wigger (2011); Wigger and Buch-Hansen (2012).
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